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This version March 2, 2018 In the midst of the Great Recession, John Boehner, former speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, stated that it's time for government to tighten their belts and show the American people that we 'get it' (CBS News' Face the Nation, March 2, 2009). This argument has popular appeal with the average person who is familiar with the concept of budgeting in his or her everyday life. But the idea that government too must 'tighten its belt' as a necessary policy response to higher indebtedness is what we call the household fallacy.
The 'belt tightening' view has been widely criticized by a group of journalists and academic economists, most notably Martin Wolf (2013) and Paul Krugman (2015) . Wolf and Krugman used arguments based on Keynesian economics to claim that austerity, reducing government spending or increasing taxes, was the wrong policy response to the Great Recession. 1 They argued that the level of employment is often inefficiently low, and that fiscal stimulus in a recession can reduce inefficient levels of unemployment and generate sufficient new tax revenues to pay for itself.
We provide a different reason to be skeptical of the claim that fiscal deficits must be actively adjusted to repay outstanding debt. Our results hold even if the economy always operates at full employment and all markets clear. They rest on the fact that, in an overlappinggenerations (OLG) model, changes in government debt cause changes in the real interest rate that redistribute the burden of repayment across generations. The interest rate adjustments that generate this redistribution arise under standard assumptions about utility and endowments but are assumed away in the workhorse representative agent (RA) model. Our argument does not rely on the assumption that the equilibrium is dynamically inefficient and it holds in a version of the OLG model where the real interest rate is always positive. * We would like to thank, without implicating, seminar participants at the Bank of England, Deutsche Bundesbank, Glasgow University and Narodowy Bank Polski. 1 For an updated version of the Keynesian argument see Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and for an alternative
Why Government Debt is Different: Debunking the Fallacy
Governments are monopoly suppliers of risk-free treasury securities. In contrast to households, which are assumed to be price-takers, government debt-management policies have firstorder implications for the interest rate. We show that an increase in government debt can, under plausible parameterizations of the economy, cause a drop in the real interest rate. As a consequence, the fiscal authority can run an active policy that ignores the level of debt when determining the path of the primary fiscal deficit.
2 To make this point formally, we use a twogeneration overlapping generations model. The key to our result is that the agents who hold government debt are distinct from those who repay it through higher taxes. 1.1. The Supply of Government Bonds. Consider a government which purchases g t units of a consumption good in period t, financed from lump-sum taxation τ t and from the sale of one period pure discount bonds. A bond issued at date t is a claim on consumption goods at date t + 1 and we use the symbol b t+1 to denote the number of these bonds issued at date t.
Let R t+1 be the real interest factor from t to t + 1 and let 1/R t+1 denote the date t price of the bond. The one-period government budget constraint is given by the expression,
Let d t , defined as,
be the primary fiscal deficit, with negative values of d t denoting a surplus. Using this definition, we may rewrite Equation 1 governing the accumulation of government debt as,
1.2. The Demand for Government Bonds. Every period, the young receive an after tax endowment of 1 unit of the consumption good and the old receive an after tax endowment of w 2 ≥ 0 units of the consumption good. 4 Using the convention that a superscript denotes the 2 Leeper (1991) refers to a fiscal policy as active if taxation and expenditure are independent of the path of real interest rates.
3 The two-period overlapping generations model has been extensively used in the literature. See, for example, Gale (1973); Cass et al. (1979) ; Balasko and Shell (1981) ; Grandmont (1985) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1991) . Gourieroux et al. (1982) and Azariadis and Guesnerie (1986) study stochastic extensions, while Diamond (1965) replaces government debt with capital as the sole investment opportunity. Farmer and Zabczyk (2018) show that the same mechanism that allows fiscal policy to be 'active' in the model is also present in a carefully calibrated setup featuring 70 cohorts. 4 Taxes are covered in more detail in Section A of a Technical Appendix that is available online.
and consumption in each period of life solves the following maximization problem,
Here, β > 0 and α ≤ 1 are parameters, with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution given by η ≡ 1/ (1 − α) and log-utility corresponding to α → 0. This problem has a closed-form solution for consumption, with the implied savings function of the young equal to,
Since the old don't save, aggregate savings are equal to the savings of the young: S(R t+1 ) ≡ s 1 (R t+1 ). For bond markets to clear, aggregate savings must equal the existing supply of government bonds b t plus a stock of new bonds issued (or retired) to cover the primary deficit
Crucially, Equation 5 establishes that whenever bond demand is less than infinitely elastic, i.e.
as long as S(·) is not vertical, the market clearing real interest rate R t+1 will depend on the stock of debt b t + d t which the government has to refinance. 
We further impose
Condition 2 (Dynamic Efficiency). There exists a date t and a number > 0, such that
Condition 1 is meant to characterize fiscal policymakers, who, to paraphrase John Boehner, 'don't get it'. Specifically, they fail to adjust the size of the primary deficit d in response to changes in economic conditions and the level of debt outstanding. We focus on this case to demonstrate that, contrary to those who argue for austerity to counteract a recession, an unresponsive fiscal policy need not result in explosive debt dynamics. In line with post-war US experience, we assume that d is negative and hence the treasury runs a primary surplus.
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Condition 2 requires that the equilibrium real rate eventually becomes strictly positive. We make this assumption to rule out models with a negative interest rate in which the equilibrium is dynamically inefficient. It is well known that fiscal policy can be active in this case as a negative interest rate erodes the value of government debt.
Iterating on Equation 3
, and imposing Condition 1 yields,
Condition 2 ensures that the limiting term vanishes as long as debt b s does not explode. In any such equilibrium debt b 1 can be thus expressed as the NPV of future fiscal surpluses,
As our starting point, we assume that the economy is in a perfect foresight equilibrium with some initial level of debtb 1 . The equilibrium assumption implies that the initial level of debt is related to the expected value of future surpluses by Equation 6. Next, we consider a thought experiment in which we increase the initial level of debt fromb 1 to some higher level b new >b 1 , say, due to unplanned government expenditure in support of the financial system.
We ask if Equation 6 can continue to hold if the government continues to maintain a constant positive primary surplus, −d.
According to the household fallacy the answer is no. In the absence of austerity (i.e. falls in d t for some t) government debt inevitably spirals out of control, leading to a violation of run active policy forever and the real rate dynamics prevents government debt from exploding.
5 Cochrane (2018) shows that the US ran a primary surplus of approximately 2% of potential GDP in almost every year prior to the Great Recession.
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Because a lower path of real rates in response to a higher initial level of debt b 1 ensures debt stability, we refer to the real interest rate as an automatic stabilizer.
But why should equilibrium real rates respond this way to changes in initial conditions?
Because the young are savers, and, if the stock of government debt is large, negative income effects associated with lower interest rates induce them to consume less and save more. In what follows we show that income effects are large enough under a credible calibration of our model for this case to be of practical relevance.
1.4. Equilibrium Stability: The Case of Strong Income Effects. To study the properties of equilibria we start by defining a steady state to be a pair of numbers {R,b} that solves,
It follows from inspection of equations (7) To analyze the dynamics of the OLG model we use the bond market clearing condition (Equation 5) to define a correspondence φ : R :→ R + such that,
Using the definition of φ, we can rewrite Equation 3 as
where In this case, we obtain the case of automatically-stabilizing debt discussed previously. The last two columns of Table 1 show that, in the steady state associated with a surplus of 2% of GDP, the equilibrium real interest factor isR = 1.06 and the debt to GDP ratio is 38%.
Because we have only two generations, a period corresponds to approximately 40 years.
A calibrated value for β of 0.086 implies an annual discount factor of 0.94 which is close to 7 The shift causes a parallel shift to the right of the equilibrium correspondence f (bt, d) as indicated. Proof that the correspondingR > 1 is provided in Section B of the Online Appendix. We start by formally introducing government spending and taxation. Lettingw 1 andw 2 denote pre-tax, real endowments we assume real lump-sum tax obligations of τ 1 on the young and τ 2 on the old, such that
Since taxes, like endowments, will be assumed time-invariant, the quantities of 1 and w 2 appearing in the consumers' maximization problem can be interpreted as after-tax endowments, with the consumers' optimization problem requiring no further modification.
Appendix B. Steady States B.1. The balanced budget case (d = 0). When d = 0 our setup is essentially the same as that considered by Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973) , with population growth set to zero and a constant relative risk aversion utility specification. A steady state of this model is a pair R ,b such that
Proposition 1. The system of steady state equations (B.1)-(B.2) has exactly two solutions. Using the terminology proposed in Samuelson (1958) and Gale (1973), these are: (i) the golden rule (GR) steady state, in whichR GR = 1 andb GR = s 1 (1) and (ii) the autarkic steady state, which hasb AU = 0 andR AU solving s 1 R AU = 0. After plugging in and simplifying these can be shown to equal
Proof. The proof follows from the more general existence theorem in Gale (1973) . Like Gale (1973) we assume away the coincidental case (w 2 ) 1 η = β implying that there will always be two distinct steady states. The fact that the formulae above satisfy equations (B.1)-(B.2) completes the proof.
Corollary 2. A model is Samuelson (classical) iff β η > w 2 (β η < w 2 ).
Proof. Gale (1973) referred to a model as Samuelson (classical) ifc 1,GR < 1 (c 1,GR > 1), which sinceb = 1 −c 1 translates intob GR > 0 (b GR < 0). The corollary then immediately follows from the formula forb GR in Equation B.3. Proof. We note that one of two cases is possible.
In the first d = 0 and, as shown in Proposition 1R = 1 is one of two solutions to our system. Since the bond market accumulation equation implies 1 −R b =Rd =⇒ 1 −R b + d = d, therefore multiplying the bond market clearing condition by 1 −R we are ensuring that the roots of 1 −R s 1 R = 0 give us all the SS solutions forR.
In the second case, when d = 0;R = 1 is not a solution to our system because it violates bond market accumulation. In this case, multiplying by 1 −R is like multiplying by a constant, hence also implies no loss of generality. This completes the proof. This result will prove very helpful as the left hand side of Equation B.4 is continuous inR, and in particular does not depend on the primary fiscal deficit d. we also know that s 1 R = β η − w 2R−η R 1−η + β η and so, since the denominator is always positive (the domain is restricted toR > 0), therefore the sign is determined by the numerator. Because η ≥ 0 therefore the numerator will be negative in the vicinity of 0 and strictly positive in +∞. This concludes the proof. An immediate implication of Lemma 4 is that the behavior of the f R function defined in Equation B.4 in the vicinity of the balanced and golden rule steady states for the 'Samuelson' calibration is as depicted in Figure 2 (note the presence of 1 −R in the definition of f R which additionally affects the sign). Crucially, the steady state real interest ratesR for values of d = 0 correspond to intersections of the blue lines with the horizontal red-dashed line at d. The chart also makes clear why we shall refer to the new SSs as the 'shifted' autarkic and golden rule steady states. We can thus immediately read equilibrium values ofR corresponding to small d off the chart. Similarly, we can use Figure 1 to characterize equilibrium values of b corresponding to small d. Information that can be obtained by combining these two tools is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. All possible steady state combinations of R ,b for (small) d 0 are characterized in Table 1 .
Classical Case: In what follows, we shall focus attention on the 'shifted' golden rule steady state corresponding to d < 0 and the Samuelson calibration (bottom two rows of the first column in Table  1 ), for whichR > 1 andb > β η − w 2 / (1 + β η ) > 0 -i.e. in steady state we will have a strictly positive level of savings and a strictly positive real (net) interest rate, satisfying Condition 2 for dynamic efficiency.
will depend on the savings of the young, i.e. the difference between consumption in the initial period and the initial endowment of 1.
To make the Slutsky decomposition directly applicable to our setup, we note that by choosing the second good as numeraire the respective derivatives will need to be evaluated at p 1 , p 2 ; e 1 , e 2 ; W 2 = R t+1 , 1; 1, w 2 ; 0 which additionally highlights that the real interest rate R t+1 is the only (relative) price in the model. Increases in R t+1 make consumption in the second period cheaper in terms of consumption in period 1 -less has to be saved by the young to enjoy a unit of consumption when old -but they also increase income from the stock of saving s 1 (R t+1 ) when the young are net savers. The first of these effects, the substitution effect, will tend to shift consumption into the future. The second of these effects, the income effect, would tend to increase consumption in both periods. Accordingly, the total effect of changes in R t+1 on first period consumption, and hence also on total savings, is ambiguous and is determined by the respective sizes of both these effects. These are characterized in the proposition below.
Proposition 8. The substitution (SE) and income (IE) effects of a change in the real interest rate R t+1 on the consumption of the young c 1 equal respectively
Proof. Straight from the definition of Hicksian demand, the substitution effect equals
where we have used the fact that the Hicksian demand function evaluated at U * (the first term in brackets in the final line) is identically equal to Marshallian demand, i.e.
The income effects can then be computed as
which completes the proof.
and so our dynamic equation is ∀t ≥ 1 :
We immediately note that the choice of R 1 is inconsequential. The values of R 2 and b 2 only depend on b 1 , itself an initial condition. Accordingly, the steady state will be stable if and only if both eigenvalues of J lie within the unit circle. The eigenvalues are roots of the characteristic polynomial
We immediately see that the first eigenvalue is always equal to zero, while the other will depend on the properties of f 1 R(+1) if and only ifb + d = 0. This re-iterates the importance of non-zero steady state bond holdings. Specifically, ifb + d = 0 then the steady state would be unstable wheneverR > 1 i.e. in all the economically interesting situations. Instead, the case we highlight Unsurprisingly, the exact condition guaranteeing that
is equivalent to one ensuring that income effects exceed substitution effects. This is characterized analytically in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. The Golden Rule Steady State in Samuelson's calibration is stable if and only if
Proof. The first condition we require for stability is f 1 R(+1) < 0 -i.e. we want savings to decrease as interest rates increase. The derivative of the savings function has already been characterized when discussing income and substitution effects and equals
and so, in particular, its sign will be determined by the numerator. This, in the Golden Rule Steady State (whereR = 1, and where we evaluate the derivative), equals
The derivative is negative, implying an eigenvalue smaller than one, if and only if
which is equivalent to α < −w 2 β η + 1 β η − w 2 . We additionally want to make sure that the eigenvalue is not smaller than −1, i.e.
Since f 1 R(+1) is negative therefore this is equivalent to
which is the the required result. Because
therefore a necessary and sufficient condition is simply the last one, which completes the proof.
Appendix E. The Monetary Extension
Aside from being very stylized, our OLG model is purely real, potentially raising questions about the relevance of the automatic stabilizer mechanism in economies where fiat money has value. We therefore now show how the model can be reinterpreted as the cashless limit of an economy with nominal government debt, where monetary policy is constrained by the zero lower bound.
In the nominal OLG model the government continues to purchase g t units of a consumption good in period t which is financed from lump-sum taxes and through issuance of nominal debt. Each government bond has a face value of one dollar. B t denotes the number of bonds issued at time t and B t−1 represents the dollar value of debt to be repaid at time t. Q t denotes the time t dollar bond price. Proceeds from debt issuance Q t B t and lump-sum tax revenues p t τ t are used to pay B t−1 to holders of government bonds issued in period t − 1 and to purchase g t for p t g t dollars. Here p t denotes the price of the consumption good in dollars, which serves as the unit of account. The government budget constraint, or debt accumulation equation, is Define the inflation factor by the identity Π t+1 ≡ p t+1 /p t , and note that the nominal interest rate i t is linked to the bond price, Q t , via the expression 1 + i t ≡ 1/Q t . Using these relations, we may combine the Fisher parity equation R t+1 ≡ (1 + i t ) /Π t+1 with the assumption that the nominal interest rate is zero to arrive at a restatement of the government debt accumulation equation in purely real terms, . We have shown that the more descriptively realistic nominal model yields the exact same market clearing conditions, and hence the same dynamics for real variables as the model discussed in the body of the note.
